Reading Group Guide to Autopsy of a Crime Lab

Autopsy of a Crime Lab: Exposing the Flaws in Forensics 

Brandon L. Garrett

Forensic analysis is perhaps best known through its fictional portrayals in crime novels and television courtroom dramas: A crime occurs, law enforcement gathers evidence from the scene, and a team of dedicated forensic analysts interrogate that evidence in a crime lab using cutting-edge scientific methods. Potential suspects get fingerprinted, an identifying “match” gets made with the help of government databases, and judges allow prosecutors to introduce the unbiased testimony of proven experts in the field who trot out their damning, seemingly incontrovertible forensic conclusions to an attentive jury.  

Autopsy of a Crime Lab exposes some of the most common misconceptions about forensic analysis and examines their collective impact on the criminal justice system. Through detailed examinations of the forensic failures responsible for the wrongful convictions of exonerees, author Brandon L. Garrett categorizes the errors made by forensic “experts,” identifies how and why these mistakes continue to occur, and argues forcefully for a comprehensive, science-based, multi-pronged approach to restore integrity to the essential discipline of forensics.  You can read more about the book, and learn how purchase it or request it for your library, at its University of California Press webpage: https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520379336/autopsy-of-a-crime-lab

Questions for Discussion 

1. Prior to reading Autopsy of a Crime Lab, what was your opinion of fingerprint evidence? How have your views changed in light of what you now know? Why might fictional portrayals of forensic analysis influence real-life perceptions of its accuracy and reliability?  

2. “With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis…no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.” (7)  What implications can be drawn from this critique by the NAS of common forensic methodologies used by law enforcement? To what extent does society’s faith in the criminal justice system depend on a shaky premise—that forensic analysis of all kinds is infallible? 

3. Consider the 1982 “bite mark case” in Newport News, Virginia, that resulted in a murder conviction and death sentence for Keith Allen Harward, who was incarcerated for 33 years before being exonerated by DNA analysis. How does Harward’s case expose forensic odontology as pseudoscience? Should experts whose flawed forensic analysis leads to the conviction of innocent people be held responsible for those injustices? Why or why not? 

4. Unlike older forensics methods that connect evidence to individual suspects and assert questionable “matches,” DNA testing generates statistical probabilities. How does this paradigm shift undergone by forensic analysis—from its humble beginnings as an outgrowth of the law enforcement community to its reliance on cutting-edge science, math, and digital technologies—change the playing field? Why might this shift might be problematic for all parties in the criminal justice system?    

5. Together with the Innocence Project co-founder Peter Neufeld, author Brandon L. Garrett discovered extensive flawed forensic testimony in cases that later resulted in DNA exonerations. If you were selected as a juror after reading Autopsy of a Crime Lab, and forensic experts testified at trial on fingerprints, firearms, bite marks, blood patterns, hair strands, or arson, how would you feel about relying on that evidence to render your verdict?  

6. “What is expertise? A person should only be considered an expert if they are in fact very good at forensics work.” (96) Given all that is at stake in forensic analysis, how does the fact that some forensics jobs require no formal training affect your opinion of the discipline as a whole? To what extent do you agree with the author that forensic analysts should be required to demonstrate their reliability through regular proficiency testing?  

7. Consider the hidden role of bias in forensic analysis. In your discussion, you may want to address different types of bias, including confirmation bias, adversarial bias, and context bias. How does blinding like the kind used by the Houston Forensic Crime Center work to combat these kinds of bias? 

8. Discuss how improperly-run crime labs and crime scene contamination contribute to forensic analysis failures. How would you begin to address the phenomenon of so-called “bad apples” within crime lab and law enforcement personnel? Which of the many egregious failures by forensics experts examined in Autopsy of a Crime Lab left an impression on you?   

9. “It should be unconstitutional to ever use black box machines, of unknown reliability, to investigate crimes, much less to convict people of crimes.” (166) How does commercial, proprietary technology of the kind used by law enforcement agencies to gather forensic evidence potentially impinge on individual rights? 

10. Discuss the impact of digital databases on the field of forensics. To what extent do these databases privilege law enforcement officers over the accused? In your discussion, consider the significance of the case of Brandon Mayfield, the Oregon attorney whose fingerprint was erroneously identified by the FBI in its investigation into the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Why was that case so seminal in transforming forensic analysis?

 

An Interview with Brandon L. Garrett

Q: In Autopsy of a Crime Lab, you characterize your views on forensics as a young lawyer as “unformed” and recall that you assumed “most of it was good science.” To what extent do you find a similar good-faith attitude persists among lawyers, judges, and jurors today?

A: I have surveyed thousands of people eligible for jury duty around the country, and they overwhelmingly report that they think that different types of forensic evidence are unique and extremely reliable. We share a broad cultural assumption that evidence like a latent fingerprint can be identified and linked to a single person. Lawyers even worry that there is a CSI effect, and jurors will never convict a person unless there is forensic evidence.  The opposite is true: people place great weight on forensic evidence and are really shocked to hear that the reliability of so much of that evidence is untested to this day.

Q: The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., put the onus on the judges to assure the validity and reliability of evidence before admitting it at trial. Given their professional commitment to administering justice, why do you think judges aren’t leading the charge to improve the overall quality control of forensic evidence?

A: Judges have failed us.  They have not meaningfully acted as gatekeepers to make sure that only reliable expert evidence is used in criminal cases.  Lawyers generally lack scientific literacy and for years, they simply accepted what forensic experts have said at face value. Judges are also reluctant to keep out evidence that prosecutors rely on; many come from a prosecution background themselves, and themselves remember relying on the same types of forensic evidence.  The result is a deeply inaccurate and unfair system.

Q: You offer a compelling mythological alternative to blind lady justice—that of Perseus seizing the shared eye of the three Graea—and propose it as a new kind of model for the type of blinding that should be incorporated into forensic analysis to render it both more scientific and more just. Can you elaborate on this metaphor for your readers?   

A: We are all biased; our expectations always affect our decision-making.  Usually that is a good thing, but for forensic experts, it can cause tragic miscarriages of justice.  We need our forensic experts to work like scientists, without biasing information, like the defendant’s race or criminal record.  We can do that by blinding them: by giving them only the information they need to do their forensic analyses and nothing more.

Q:  If a single ethical code for practicing forensic analysts were to be established in the United States, how do you envision its enforcement? What level of responsibility do professional associations like the American Board of Criminalists (ABC) and American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) assume currently in the event of unethical testimony by one of their members?  

A: We need forensic crime labs and professional organizations to review how forensic examiners actually do their work and testify in court.  More labs, fortunately, are starting to see that as part of their job, but they need binding ethical standards.  In the past, when forensic experts testified in ways that were overstated, unscientific, and outright fabricated, they suffered no professional consequence whatsoever.  That must stop.

Q: Why are some in the law enforcement community resistant to the creation of a National Institute of Forensic Science modeled after the National Institutes of Health, as proposed by the landmark 2009 report on forensics by the National Academy of Sciences? Given the many cases of faulty forensic analysis documented and overturned by organizations like the Innocence Project that have resulted in exonerations and significant financial settlements, why hasn’t more been done by the government to prevent these catastrophes from happening?   

A: Creating a new federal agency is no small request but the scientific community did not lightly call for a National Institute of Forensic Science.  They felt that it was crucial.   Forensics should be regulated, just like air travel and pharmaceuticals.  Crime labs need to be regulated like our clinical laboratories have long been.  The only explanation for the difference is that as a society we care less about the tests done in criminal cases than the tests done by doctors.

Q: How have your private encounters with exonerees who have been victims of faulty forensics affected you?    

A: I decided to become a law professor because of my work representing exonerees who had been wrongly convicted, including based on false bitemark, hair comparison, and blood typing evidence.  Their bravery and resilience inspired me, and I wanted to work to make sure that our criminal legal system and our scientific institutions never let us down so terribly ever again.

Activities for further discussion

1. Prior to your next gathering, watch a conversation between Keith Harward, whose story is told in Chapter 2, and Peter Neufeld, co-founder of the Innocence Project, hosted by the author: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yJnr3_QbVFI. How does seeing Harward speak about what he endured make you feel about the stakes in criminal cases and forensics? Can society ever truly make it up to exonerees like Harward? 

2. Prior to your gathering, watch three short videos featuring Sharia Mayfield, Keith Harward, and Dr. Itiel Dror, as well as the author at the University of California Press book webpage, https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520379336/autopsy-of-a-crime-lab

3. With members of your discussion group, identify one of the programs recommended by the Innocence Project, https://innocenceproject.org/wrongful-conviction-media/ and watch it separately or as a group. What aspects of Autopsy of a Crime Lab came to mind during your screening? If you found yourself the victim of flawed forensic analysis, where would you choose to start to prove yourself innocent of the crime? 

4. Are you one of the more than 26 million people who have submitted their DNA commercial databases to learn more about their ancestry? Popularized by programs like PBS’s Find Your Roots, inexpensive genetic analysis promising clues to one’s family background and medical profile is now widely available, but also largely unregulated. How would you feel if DNA that you or your relatives submitted resulted in criminal prosecutions? What kind of privacy laws—if any—do you feel should be in place for DNA databases? In your conversation, consider the benefits and the drawbacks of this contemporary technology.  

5. With your discussion group, consider the some of the forensic failures outlined in Autopsy of a Crime Lab in the larger context of the death penalty. Should death sentences for capital crimes be permitted in cases where exonerating DNA evidence is inadmissible or unattainable? How about life sentences? To what extent are wrongful convictions inevitable in a system administered by human beings? How should wrongful convictions be addressed by our criminal justice system?  

6. Have each member of your discussion group write in three sentences or less their essential takeaways from Autopsy of a Crime Lab. Then, have your discussion group share their sentences. How closely do these individual assessments overlap and where do they diverge? If you think of each individual’s three sentences as “expert analysis” of the same material, to what extent does this low-stakes exercise mirror the imprecision of forensic experts offering their own inherently subjective views on evidence? 

About the Author 

Brandon L. Garrett is the L. Neil Williams, Jr. Professor of Law at Duke University, where he directs the Wilson Center for Science and Justice. His author page is at www.brandonlgarrett.com. His previous books include: Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go WrongToo Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations, and End of its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can Revive Criminal Justice. He lives in North Carolina with his family.

Just Hypothetical Uses of Rapid DNA

In my Autopsy of a Crime Lab book, I talk about the risks of error in forensics, including when police agencies take lab work into the field, using kits that are often of uncertain reliability.  Deep into the book, I describe how that in some police departments, one type of field test being increasingly used is “rapid DNA.” I describe some of the concerns with it, including reliability of the test results, and that the evidence can be consumed, making it impossible for a crime lab to later conduct an accurate DNA test. 

And then I make a truly embarrassing error of my own, in discussing a wonderful article by Erin Murphy, titled “DNA in the Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Research Service Report* (*From the Future).”  

Murphy’s great article is hypothetical (as the title makes clear) and discusses a range of scenarios that could occur if these uses of DNA, along with expanding DNA databases, continue through the next decade.

Two of the compelling hypotheticals that Murphy gave involved a pop star being falsely connected to unsolved murders in Hawaii by rapid DNA test results that were erroneous, and a state senator in Ohio being falsely connected to a series of child sexual assaults after giving a similar field DNA testing.  Both were hypothetical scenarios designed to illustrate how a quick and dirty field DNA test could lead to real injustices.

But in discussing the issues those examples raise, my paragraph begins with a glaring error in its first sentence: “This is not hypothetical; already police have falsely arrested and jailed people due to mistaken rapid DNA results.” And I ended the paragraph, noting, “One wonders how often rapid DNA mistakes occur in cases of people who are not well known and who cannot afford lawyers.”  These hypotheticals are well-put for sparking discussion—but again, they were not real events and were purely hypothetical. 

There is much to read about the issues raised by rapid DNA technology; the Policing Project has written an excellent primer.  I strongly recommend Murphy’s article about the future of DNA in our criminal system and the dangers of rapid DNA errors.  However, my own error in citing to those hypotheticals could not be more obvious. I wish I had caught it earlier.  A culture of acknowledging and transparency surrounding error is exactly what I call for in crime laboratories, and in the same spirit, I wanted to point out my own mistake as soon as I discovered it.

 

Declining Corporate Penalties

The NYT describes new data from the Duke/UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry:

• A 72 percent decline in corporate penalties from the Justice Department’s criminal prosecutions, to $3.93 billion from $14.15 billion

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj-corporate-penalties.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer

Harv. L. Rev. "Recent Publications" Review

End of Its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can Revive Criminal Justice. By Brandon L. Garrett. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2017. Pp. 331. $29.95. Capital punishment in America is facing its own slow but assured death. Jurors nationwide are increasingly reluctant to impose the death penalty, even in states where capital punishment is still on the books. In End of Its Rope, Professor Brandon L. Garrett embarks on an epic game of “whodunit?,” using hand-collected data and case studies to identify the factors contributing to the death penalty’s demise. For Henry McCollum, an increased awareness that wrongful convictions for capital offenses commonly occur led to exoneration (pp. 18–48). For James Holmes (p. 55) and Samuel Cooper (pp. 59–60), appeals to mercy and evidence of the past abuse they suffered helped them avoid capital punishment. Garrett explores how protection for the mentally ill and disabled (p. 65), improved defense lawyering (p. 130), and the availability of life without parole (LWOP) (p. 167) also shift preferences away from the death penalty. End of Its Rope is an exercise in hopeful realism: although systemic failures such as mandatory sentencing, racial bias, and overuse of LWOP still persist (pp. 167–86), Garrett derives from the death penalty’s swan song lessons of justice and mercy needed to fix our criminal justice system.

Grisham on Wrongful Convictions and Flawed Forensics

John Grisham wrote a powerful op-ed, here, today in the L.A Times, discussing causes of wrongful convictions, including flawed forensic evidence.  He notes, citing to data that I've collected, that "Of the 330 people exonerated by DNA tests between 1989 and 2015, 71% were convicted based on forensic testimony, much of which was flawed, unreliable, exaggerated or sometimes outright fabricated." 

Grisham then discusses a fantastic new book by Radley Balko and Tucker Carringon, “The Cadaver King and the Country Dentist,” that describes how over many years, two experts in Mississippi, testified about forensics to convict people later exonerated.  

You can read the testimony in one of those cases, later shown to be false, in the death penalty case of DNA exoneree Kennedy Brewer, here, on my resource website.  The analyst concluded that Brewer’s teeth in fact left the marks: “Within reasonable medical certainty, the teeth of Kenneth—un, Mr. Kennedy Brewer inflicted the patterns described on the body” of the victim, and explaining that reasonable medical certainty means “yes, he did” leave the marks.

Book Panel: The Death Penalty at the 'End of Its Rope' and the Future of Criminal Justice

Thursday, Feb. 22

4 p.m., Caplin Pavilion, UVA Law

Reception to follow

Leading litigators and scholars will discuss UVA Law professor Brandon L. Garrett's new book, "End Of Its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can Revive Criminal Justice."

The book analyzes data on over two decades of death sentences to both explore causes of the decline in American death sentencing and its implications for the future of criminal justice reform.

Panelists include death penalty lawyer David Bruck of Washington & Lee Law School; Robin Konrad of the Death Penalty Information Center; Evan Mandery of John Jay College and author of "A Wild Justice"; and Carol Steiker of Harvard Law School and the Criminal Justice Policy Program, and co-author of "Courting Justice."

UVA Law professsor Steve Braga, director of clinical programs and director of the Appellate Litigation Clinic, will serve as moderator.

Garrett's research and teaching interests include criminal procedure, wrongful convictions, habeas corpus, corporate crime, scientific evidence, civil rights, civil procedure and constitutional law. His recent research includes studies of DNA exonerations and organizational prosecutions. Garrett is also the author of "Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations" and "Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong."

Why Jurors are Rejecting the Death Penalty

My "End of its Rope" book comes out in September.  Read in Slate about some of the factors that explain why death sentences are declining so rapidly, including because jurors are rejecting prosecutors' requests for death sentences.  The image below shows just how fast death sentences have decline---there were only 31 death sentences in 2016 from a high over over 300 in the mid-1990s.

 

 

End of its Rope

My new book is forthcoming from Harvard U. Press in Fall 2017 and is available for pre-order now.  The book explores the causes of the great decline in the American death penalty and what we can learn from that remarkable trend about how to restore our criminal justice system.

The Year of Bank Prosecutions

In a new piece in Slate, here, I describe how "Fines in the millions and billions of dollars made headlines again and again in 2015, as the Department of Justice set new records in prosecutions of wrongdoing corporations."  Below is a figure showing the dramatic rise in corporate penalties imposed by federal prosecutors.  What I describe in this piece is where much of the corporate prosecution penalties in 2015 came from: how "what was different in 2015 was that so much of the money paid by corporate targets came from banks: almost $7 billion of the $9 billion in total penalties paid by prosecuted companies." Do these cases answer concerns that financial institutions have been "too big to jail"?  They show that banks can be prosecuted, and in large numbers, and paying record fines.  Whether individuals will be held accountable in these cases and whether meaningful changes will occur at the banks to reduce recidivism---that is another question entirely.


It Takes a Plan (To End ‘Too Big to Jail’)

“If you only look at the big banks, you will be missing the forest for the trees,” said Hillary Clinton in the debate last night, responding to calls to break up the major banks.  Corporate crime is a broader problem touching every industry and not just Wall Street. Clinton has proposed for the first time a top-to-bottom plan for policing and preventing corporate crime and financial misconduct. We have not seen the likes of it in this campaign or elsewhere. The plan addresses systemic risk in financial institutions, or “too big to fail,” but my interest is in “too big to jail”: the way the plan carefully addresses concerns that companies and banks commit massive crimes but receive mere slaps on the wrist.

We are experiencing a corporate crime wave. Billion-dollar fines are now common in industries ranging from Big Pharma to the largest banks to energy companies. Yet we just saw GM receive an out-of-court deal for concealing defects that cost over a hundred people their lives — and no charges for any employees. We have seen banks like AIG, Barclays, Credit Suisse, HSBC, JPMorgan, Lloyds, UBS and others prosecuted over and over again — typically with no charges for any employees. After the financial crisis, we saw compromised deals with banks, failures to prosecute individuals and legislation that did not generate serious accountability...

More on Clinton's plan at : http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/10/14/it-takes-a-plan-to-end-too-big-to-jail/

VA Festival of the Book Panel on Government and Corruption

Authors Zephyr Teachout, Brandon Garrett, and Charles Lewis participated in a panel discussion on government and corruption. Zephyr Teachout is the author ofCorruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United. Brandon Garret is the author of Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations. Charles Lewis is the author of 935 Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America’s Moral Integrity.

This event was part of the 21st annual Virginia Festival of the Book, held on March 18-23, 2015, in Charlottesville.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?324981-1/panel-discussion-government-corruption

Listen to the Virginia Insights Show on WMRA

Rehabilitation... Really?

By TOM GRAHAM

To some, a justice system approach that includes efforts at rehabilitation may seem reasonable; especially when dealing with first offenders guilty of small crimes.

But why have rehabilitation-strategies become a significant tactic for federal prosecutors who chase after corporate crime of massive scale?

We get details on how this new way of responding to corporate lawbreaking got started.  Plus an assessment of how well it is, or isn’t, working.

Book Talk at ACS

At this week's ACS Book Talk:

Too Big to Jail

by Brandon L. Garrett, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Since the 2011 publication of Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, Professor Garrett has written widely on issues of criminal procedure, scientific evidence, corporate crime, and the law. This fall, Harvard University Press published his new book, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations.

Prominent cries of “too big to jail” greeted the decision by federal prosecutors in 2012 not to convict HSBC, the international bank headquartered in London.  When HSBC was investigated for violations of international sanctions with countries like Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Burma, and, if that were not enough, facilitating the laundering of “at least $881 million in drug proceeds,” it paid a then-record penalty of $1.4 billion.  The scale of the violations was shocking.  And prosecutors described concerted efforts to help dirty money transactions avoid detection, with internal notes like:  “care sanctioned country,” “do not mention our name in NY,” or “do not mention Iran.”  Drug cartels usedcash boxes “designed to fit the precise dimensions of the tellers’ windows in HSBC’s Mexico branches.”  When HSBC’s compliance officers raised alarms, they were “discouraged” and ignored.

“We accept responsibility for our past mistakes,” said the bank’s CEO at the time HSBC settled the case.  A corporate monitor would supervise a revamping of compliance.  The bank had hired hundreds of compliance employees and spent millions improving anti-money laundering programs.  But the bank was not convicted of any crime.  This galledadvocateseditorial boards, members of Congress, and the public.  The same day prosecutors filed their case, they asked the judge to approve what is called a deferred prosecution agreement.  The case would be put on hold to give the bank a chance to show good conduct.  A money laundering conviction could have resulted in termination of the bank’s U.S. charter.  Yet no employees or officers were prosecuted either.  At the time, Assistant-Attorney General Lanny Brueur explained: “Our goal here is not to bring HSBC down, it’s not to cause a systemic effect on the economy, it’s not for people to lose thousands of jobs.”  And upon announcement of the settlement, HSBC shares rose

Such deals are now quite common. In my new book, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations, I examine the rapidly evolving world of corporate prosecutions.  I assembled a vast database with information from corporate prosecution agreements and plea agreements from the past decade and beyond, all of which is available online. A decade ago, federal prosecutors adopted an approach favoring such out-of-court agreements. To be sure, my data shows how penalties in corporate prosecutions haveexploded in recent years. But too often, I argue, prosecutors do not insist on punishments that are truly criminal. 

Companies cannot literally be put in jail, of course. And that is why adequately holding them accountable for crimes is so important.  Responsible officers and employees can be targeted. Firms can be structurally reformed.  Firms can pay deterrent fines and compensate victims. I found that many companies pay no fine, and even the biggest payments are typically greatly discounted. I describe how victims have intervened, like in the BP Texas City Refinery explosion case, to seek greater corporate accountability only to have their voices ignored. 

Real changes to end “too big to jail” are much needed. I suggest concrete improvements such as more stringent prosecution agreements, judicial oversight, and greater transparency.  I tell the success stories of companies like Siemens, which responded to the largest foreign bribery penalty of all time by totally transforming its leadership, compliance, and approach towards doing business. I describe how some judges have intervened. The judge in the HSBC case, noting “heavy public criticism” of the agreement, insisted on being kept apprised of the company’s compliance.  I tell the story of the KPMG tax shelter prosecutions, and describe the challenges faced by prosecutors pursuing individual wrongdoers. And I tell the story of the corporate criminal trial of the century, the Arthur Andersen trial, and how the very complexity of corporate crimes can obscure fault.

From the ongoing suffering caused by the last global financial crisis, to environmental disasters like the Gulf spill, to the harmful flow of dirty money to cartels, terrorists, and totalitarian regimes, corporate crimes impact us all.  That is why corporate prosecutions are themselves too important and too big to fail.

 

Recidivist Banks

In today's New York Times, Ben Protess and Jessica Silver-Greenberg described new investigations of banks that had already settled prosecutions in the recent past - or they thought they had.  New investigations raise a looming question whether recidivist banks will be treated differently or will have prior prosecution agreements scrapped.  So far, that has not happened. On Tuesday, UBS, which has settled three agreements with prosecutors in the past five years, had its non-prosecution agreement related to the Libor probe extended for another year - UBS was apparently not found to have violated its terms.  Which banks have been repeatedly prosecuted over the last decade?  The Times cited to some of my data, developed in Too Big to Jail, describing how since 2001, "at least eight banks" have committed further offenses having entered an agreement with prosecutors.  

Below is a list of those financial institutions that have entered more than one agreement with federal prosecutors from 2001 - present, with the type of agreement (deferred or non-prosecution or plea) and year in parenthesis.  You can view the entire collection of such prosecution agreements here and here.  Or click below on the links to read these particular prosecution agreements :

AIG (2 subsidiaries entered DPA/NPAs in 2004) (NPA 2006)

Barclays (DPA 2010) (NPA 2012

Credit Suisse (DPA 2009) (Plea Agreement 2014)

HSBC (NP 2001) (DPA 2012)

JPM (NP 2011) (DPA, 2014)

Lloyds  (DP 2009) (DPA, 2014)

UBS (DPA 2009) (NPA 2011) (NPA 2012 - now extended for another year)

Wachovia (DPA 2010) (NPA 2011